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Species extinction is a great moral wrongNearly three decades ago, Michael Soulé published an article
titled ‘‘What is Conservation Biology?’’ (1985). Its strong and
enduring inﬂuence stemmed partly from Soulé’s success in articu-
lating an appealing ethical vision for this rapidly developing ﬁeld.
At its heart was the belief that the anthropogenic extinction of spe-
cies is a great moral wrong. ‘‘The diversity of organisms is good,’’
Soulé wrote, and ‘‘the untimely extinction of populations and spe-
cies is bad.’’ Other species have ‘‘value in themselves,’’ he asserted:
an ‘‘intrinsic value,’’ which should motivate appreciation, respect,
and restraint in our dealings with them.
In ‘‘What is Conservation Science?’’ (2012), a recent attempt to
update Soulé, Peter Kareiva and Michelle Marvier lose sight of this
moral commitment. Specifying the practical principles that they
believe should guide conservationists, they give prominent place
to increasing human wealth (‘‘economic development’’) and
‘‘working with corporations,’’ while recognition of the right of
other species to continue to ﬂourish is nowhere to be found. In-
deed, the article’s rhetoric serves to normalize anthropogenic
extinctions and make readers more comfortable with them. For
example, it describes concern for the extirpation of wolves and
grizzly bears in the United States as ‘‘nostalgia’’ for ‘‘the world as
it once was,’’ and states that ‘‘some realism is in order’’ regarding
whether or not people should be required to keep other species
on the landscape when their continued presence is incompatible
with our economic goals.
Unfortunately this position does not appear to be an aberration
of this one article, but an essential part of Karieva and Marvier’s
brief for conservationists to accommodate ourselves to the new
realities of the Anthropocene Epoch. An earlier piece that they pub-
lished with Robert Lalasz, ‘‘Conservation in the Anthropocene’’
(2011), also contemplates mass extinction with equanimity, in
part, apparently, because such extinctions will not necessarily
inconvenience human beings. ‘‘Ecologists and conservationists
have grossly overstated the fragility of nature,’’ they argue there.
‘‘In many circumstances, the demise of formerly abundant species
can be inconsequential to ecosystem function. The American chest-
nut, once a dominant tree in eastern North America, has been
extinguished by a foreign disease, yet the forest ecosystem is sur-
prisingly unaffected. The passenger pigeon, once so abundant that
its ﬂocks darkened the sky, went extinct, along with countless
other species from the Steller’s sea cow to the dodo, with no cata-
strophic or even measurable effects.’’0006-3207 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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for the species in question, and perhaps too for other species that
preyed on or parasitized them, or depended on them in other ways.
But such catastrophes do not appear to count morally for the
authors—they are not real catastrophes—as long as the ‘‘ecosystem
functions’’ that beneﬁt people remain intact. (Regarding the
near-extinction of the American chestnut and the demise of the
passenger pigeon, among the most abundant tree and bird species
in temperate eastern North American forests ﬁve hundred years
ago, if they had no ‘‘measurable effects,’’ we may assume that
was because no one bothered to measure them at the time.)
According to recent studies, humanity could extinguish one out
of every three species on Earth during the next several centuries, if
we continue on our current habitat-destroying, resource-monopo-
lizing path (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity,
2010). In one sign of the times, in 2008 the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service listed the polar bear as threatened with extinction due to
current and potential future effects of global climate change. Those
of us who love wild nature receive such news with lumps in our
throats. Yet about the polar bear Kareiva et al. (2011) have this
to say:
‘‘Even that classic symbol of fragility—the polar bear, seemingly
stranded on a melting ice block—may have a good chance of
surviving global warming if the changing environment contin-
ues to increase the populations and northern ranges of harbor
seals and harp seals. Polar bears evolved from brown bears
200,000 years ago during a cooling period in Earth’s history,
developing a highly specialized carnivorous diet focused on
seals. Thus, the fate of polar bears depends on two opposing
trends—the decline of sea ice and the potential increase of
energy-rich prey. The history of life on Earth is of species evolv-
ing to take advantage of new environments only to be at risk
when the environment changes again.’’
Note the way this account equates past extinctions due to nat-
ural causes with the possible extinction of the polar bear due to
human-caused climate change. That’s just ‘‘the history of life,’’
adapting or failing to adapt to changing conditions. Note the disap-
pearance of any sense of human agency for the threat to the polar
bear: Ursus maritimus’ fate depends on ‘‘two opposing trends’’ as
‘‘the environment changes’’—not on whether or not humanity
ratchets back greenhouse gas emissions. Finally, note the glibness
with which the authors talk about the extinction of this magniﬁ-
cent beast (‘‘seemingly stranded on a melting ice block’’).
Extinguishing species through the continued expansion of hu-
man economic activities appears to be morally acceptable to Kare-
iva, Marvier and some other Anthropocene proponents (e.g.nse.
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harm people themselves. But this view is selﬁsh and unjust. Hu-
man beings already control more than our fair share of Earth’s re-
sources. If increased human numbers and economic demands
threaten to extinguish the polar bear and many other species, then
we need to limit our numbers and economic demands (Cincotta
and Gorenﬂo, 2011; Noss et al., 2013). Exactly how to curb human
demands or reform dysfunctional economic institutions that
endanger wild nature may be open questions, but they are not op-
tional questions for conservationists, nor can we ignore moral is-
sues in answering them (Rolston, 1994).
Conservation biologists, with our knowledge and appreciation
of other species, are the last people who should be making excuses
for their displacement, or making light of their extinction. It is par-
ticularly inappropriate for Peter Kareiva to do so, given his position
as chief scientist at the Nature Conservancy, an organization dedi-
cated to preserving biodiversity. TNC’s fundraising rests in part on
appeals to a strong and widely shared moral sense that other spe-
cies have a right to continued existence. Much of the conservation
value of TNC’s easements and land purchases depends on society-
wide moral and legal commitments to preserve threatened and
endangered species. Kareiva and Marvier (2012) state that they
‘‘do not wish to undermine the ethical motivations for conserva-
tion action,’’ or presumably, conservation law. Yet their articles
do precisely that, with potentially disastrous implications for prac-
tical conservation efforts, particularly in the long-term.
To be clear: we do not think there is anything wrong with peo-
ple looking after our own legitimate needs. This is an important
component of conservation, as conservation biologists have long
recognized (Greenwald et al., 2013). Kareiva and Marvier are right
to remind us that protecting ecosystem services for human beings
is important. They are right, too, that concern for our own wellbe-
ing can sometimes motivate signiﬁcant biodiversity preservation.
We believe that people should preserve other species both for their
sakes and for ours (see Primack, 2010, chapter 6, for a fuller treat-
ment of these ethical claims).
However, it is a mistake to reduce conservation solely to a self-
concerned prudence, or to anthropocentrically assume that it is
acceptable to extinguish those species that do not provide us with
important ecosystem services. As with marriage, education, or any
other important human institution or activity, an overly economis-
tic approach to conservation leads us astray morally. It makes us
selﬁsh, and that is the last thing we want when the very existence
of so many other life forms is at stake. Fairly sharing the lands and
waters of Earth with other species is most importantly a matter of
justice, not economic convenience (Staples and Cafaro, 2012).
Natural species are the primary expressions and repositories of
organic nature’s order, creativity, and diversity. They represent
thousands of millions of years of evolution and achievement. They
show incredible functional, organizational, and behavioral com-
plexity. Every species, like every person, is unique, with its own
history and destiny. When people take so many resources or de-
grade so much habitat that another species is driven extinct, wehave taken or damaged too much, and brought a valuable and
meaningful story to an untimely end.
At its core, conservation biology afﬁrms that knowledge about
the living world should go hand in hand with love and respect
for it. Colin Tudge puts it well, writing in The Variety of Life
(2000): ‘‘The prime motive of science is not to control the Universe
but to appreciate it more fully. It is a huge privilege to live on Earth
and to share it with so many goodly and fantastical creatures.’’
From this perspective, even one anthropogenic extinction is one
too many. From this perspective, the goodness of the human career
on Earth depends as much on how well we appreciate and
get along with other species, as on how well we do so with other
people.
Michael Soulé (1985, 2013) is right: other species have value in
themselves and a right to continued existence free from anthropo-
genic extinction, whether or not we ﬁnd them beautiful, useful,
proﬁtable, or interesting, and whether or not preserving them is
convenient or economically beneﬁcial for people.
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